Germany’s Blundered Battle of the Bulge

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Germany’s Blundered Battle of the Bulge

Ryan Evans

11/07/07

Germany’s blundered Battle of the Bulge

The elusive Belgian Ardennes Forest played a significant role throughout the Second World War and was the deciding point in the war’s outcome on multiple occasions. Much of the western world was in consensus that the forest was impassible by armor or army. Belief that the densely wooded area posed a sufficient enough barrier was held so strongly by the French that they left the border of that area essentially opens with minimal coverage. They limited the Maginot line to end at the beginning of the edge of the forest blindly thinking that the natural boundary would be enough to hold back the Germans and that no further entrenched defenses were needed in that area.1 The French sealed their fate as German ingenuity found a way to clear a path through the Ardennes with its Panzers in order to bypass the feared Maginot French stronghold in the spring of 1940 ending in the fall of France.2 Five years later, in December, the same region played another significant part however, this time the tide turned to not only favor the Allies, but cripple the Germans so severely that it doomed them from any hope of winning the war. The events between December 16th and January 16th, 1945 came to be known as the Battle of the Bulge in which the Germans made a last ditch effort grand offensive during terrible winter conditions in the Ardennes.3 It has been questioned how close the Germans were in obtaining success in their offensive or if they were even close at all. The offensive turned into a grand failure for the Wehrmacht, and their defeat had lasting consequences that allowed the Allied advance to proceed into the depths of Germany towards Berlin. These questions are answered among historians that the offensive was destructive for the Germans. However, academicians differ to various degrees on how bad the option actually was according to the alternatives, and what spun out of it in consequence. Though the Ardennes offensive was doomed to fail, strategically it was Germany’s best option to inflict the most damage on the Allies. Any other available option may have postponed the defeat and prevented high casualties however; it wouldn’t have been as effective. Despite this offensive’s impossibility of success due to lack of fuel and resources, utilizing the Ardennes route still made an impact in some sense.

The Germans planned for an offensive to push back the Allied advance. The issue of the tactical practicality of the German offensive was addressed by Trevor N. Dupuy and his colleagues in their book, Hitler’s Last Gamble. In their book, the offensive was assessed to be overambitious and held onto unrealistic assumptions.4 In theory, the overambitious plan sounded like it would make a difference if everything worked perfectly. The Germans dreamed that it would achieve miraculous feats and cut off the Americans. Robert E Merriam reports that Hitler’s hope was:

“To cut off the rear of Patton’s army and drive a German Wedge across the eastern portion of France, In front of Metz, to the Belgian boarder. The result-to cut off the American lines of communication, and then pinch off the armored and mechanized infantry spearheads of the American forces just meeting their first resistance in the German West Wall”5

This never happened for Hitler didn’t have enough troops and the forces around the Mosellse River were not strong enough to be effective.6 The plan’s success was not achievable with the amount of units and resources available to the Germans. The Nazis also underestimated their enemy and did not realize how capable and well equipped the Allies were, especially the Americans. The Germans vastly underestimated the capabilities of the Americans due to bias and misconceptions of the Americans’ discipline and appearance. There were other plans on the table such as a smaller offensive that scholar Heinz Magenheimer thought would have been very effective. Also there was a defensive maneuver that would have give up all the territory the Germans had worked so hard for. These other options were not aggressive enough to Hitler’s liking and did not provide the potential to deliver a surprise blow to the Allies.

In stark contradiction to the Magenheimer and other scholars that felt the large offensive operation was against the best interest of Germany, Peter Elstob believed differently. Given its choices of action and with the logical option of unconditional surrender to the Allies completely discarded and out of the question, he felt the surprise attack and attempt to take Antwerp was the most appealing option if it could have been achieved.7 Even if it were unachievable, which it turned out to be, the process of mobilizing that many troops against the Allies and catching them by surprise held the potential to deliver an effect that no other option could offer. Surprisingly, Elstob even discredits Model’s and Manteuffel’s ‘small solution’. He argues that it could not have achieved any sense of surprise and may have created a delay to the Allies and divert the front, but wouldn’t have caused any permanent effect or cut off the Allied supplies.8 Elstob believes that Germany had three other alternatives: attacking the eastern front, pulling back to defend Germany, or launching an offensive elsewhere. In Elstob’s opinion, all of these options were not ideal for they could not be easily remedied. Amassing an attack on the eastern front would have been inconclusive for there was no key strategic point to keep back the advancing Russians. Pulling back and enforcing fortress Germany might have postponed the inevitable defeat, but it would have given precious territory and supply depots to the Allies causing even more difficulty to the fleeing German military. Attacking the Allies elsewhere was difficult for they had gained control of areas which made undetected movement difficult. This left the only viable option to attempt to split the Allies and take hold of the strategic city of Antwerp. This would not only have severed the supply lines, choking and weakening the strong Allied force, but put the Germans in a position to commence attacks on other areas. This would have been possible since the Allied forces would have been both isolated and undersupplied in this scenario. Field Marshal Jodl revealed after the war that if Antwerp had been seized by the Sixth SS Panzer division, it would have been a possibility to crush Allied forces around the Aachean pocket after coordinated German attacks coming from Monschau, Maastricht and Holland were sent down on the unsupplied Allied forces.9 This might not have won Germany the war, but it would have boosted political and public opinion which would have contributed to the condition of Germany in retrospect due to Hitler’s unrelenting desire to never surrender. Germany’s gamble to cut down the Allies was a failed cause, but stood as their only hope. “Hitler’s real objective in mounting a last desperate offensive against the Western Allies in December 1944 was not to win the war, but to create a situation in which Germany, though defeated, might remain whole.”10 In this sense on a political and ideological standpoint Hitler’s last gamble succeeded in the fact that it upheld this attitude of the Third Reich to never back down in defeat.

Germany was inherently limited in its choices and its ability to successfully pull off an operation due to their dire circumstances. According to Dupuy, the Germans had very few realistic options: “The best the Germans could hope for in the Ardennes was a modestly successful spoiling attack.” 11 The supplies were too few and the Germans couldn’t afford to lose men and resources. The problem was that the casualties that Germany suffered were irreplaceable while the Americans had many reserves. The following shows how many men Germany lost. “Of a prewar population of 80,000,000 close to 13,000,000 men had been drawn into the armed services, and of these 4,000,000 have been killed, wounded, or captured.”12The Allies had the ability to replenish losses due to the vast industrial base of the United States. Germany’s crippled industry due to Allied bombing raids, was diminished and this played a role in the available resources allotted to Germany. Dupuy recognized the situation: “Despite an amazingly determined and skillful performance, the Germans did not have the resources necessary to carry Hitler’s concept to its planned conclusion unless the Allies collapsed-and the Allies were too battle wise and too strong for that.”13 The resources were so scarce that Germany didn’t have enough fuel to fully complete the operation of fully taking Antwerp. In fact, they wouldn’t have even made it half way to Antwerp before running out of fuel without scrounging up additional supplies. According to Williamson Murry and Allan R Millett’s research: “Yet the fact that the Germans had only enough fuel to get half way to Antwerp underlines the constraints that the bombing of the German oil industry had placed on the German Army.”14 The accumulated bombing on the German oil supply had finally atoned to creating logistical upsets for the Germans. Dupuy believes that the Germans had already lost the war and that if they could have prevented this catastrophic loss of men and resources due to the ill-fated Ardennes offensive, they may have been able to prolong the war further.

In the end however, with the significant strain on resources and the advances of the Allies, the Germans were on a slippery slope towards disaster. Dupuy claims that in the end the Germans’ lack of resources was one of the pivotal deciding factors in their demise and the depletion of those precious resources though the doomed Ardennes offensive served to seal their fate. Dupuy fails to see that it would have been beneficial to Germany to try to recover resources and commit a blow to the approaching Allies in order not only to allow for Germany to have pride in morale, but to undermine the Allied efforts as well. The Allies had supplies in the area ready for the taking and it would have benefited Germany greatly to raid those supply depots and carry out an offensive in which they could achieve surprise. The Germans were doomed, yet it was more fitting to the regime to go out with a fight even if it didn’t achieve success. The act of the offensive in itself would put strain on the Allies which was better than letting the Allies approach Germany unopposed.

The large offensive that was carried out by the Wehrmacht turned out to be very costly. In the planning stages, a much more reasonable offensive was in the works but was rejected by Hitler. In his book, Hitler’s War, Heinz Magenheimer explored the strategic planning stages of the operation and brought up the more manageable and realistic proposition of Field Marshal Model. Field Marshal Model wanted a smaller offensive that would essentially attempt to encircle the Allies at Aix-la Chapelle.

“It was a small solution dictated not only by limited German troop strength, but also the difficulties of supply and movement in the attack area, not to mention Allied command of the air.”15 It may have been putting less risk on the OKW by committing a smaller force, but it would have been an even more hopeless situation. The smaller strength was doomed to be crushed since the normal method of using an overwhelming force of Panzer troops was a better method to achieve victory. The small solution may have sounded reasonable but it would not have achieved anything worth striving for. This seemingly more reasonable plan was scrapped and replaced by an insane gamble putting a huge portion of the OKW at risk. Magenheimer explained that the motivation behind committing such a bold offensive and taking on such a steep risk was that if the operation succeeded, Germany would be in a position of strategic ‘freedom of action’, yet Magenheimer admits that it would hardly provide enough advantage to even hope to turn the tide of the war in favor of the Axis. This is where Magenheimer misses the point that Germany really had no other viable options to produce a noticeable blow to the Allies. If the Germans went ahead with the smaller offensive it would have required less troops and equipment cutting down potential losses and freeing up available troops for the reserve defense of Germany. However the smaller amount of troops would do very little to hinder the Allies and could prove to be even more disastrous. All things considered, due to multiple factors the risks that faced the operation were so steep that they were practically unconquerable, yet Heinz Magenheimer fails to mention that a large assault helped morale and caught the Allies by surprise. Also, if the Germans miraculously achieved their objective with the grand offensive the freedom of action that they gained would have been worth the risk for Germany to gain the strategic advantage.

The large offensive was set up to give the Germans a chance of retribution on the Allies. Even Magenheimer, who was extremely opposed to the idea, admitted that the idea could have worked to some measure had it been run without the impeding variables the Wehrmacht faced in reality. Low fuel levels, the lack of available resources, and underestimating the abilities of the Americans hindered the operation form the start. Magenheimer wrote that:

“From the operational viewpoint, a surprise attack through the Ardennes in the direction of Antwerp did stand a reasonable chance of success given able and energetic execution, continuing bad weather and the exploitation of the enemy’s weaknesses. On the other hand, seen strategically, the risks taken verged on military irresponsibility, because far too little time had been allowed for the successful conclusion of the operation and the withdrawal of the reserves that were then to be sent to support the Eastern front.”16

The Germans two front battle was devastating on its country’s resources and operational combat strength with an additional strain by the Allied strategic bombing campaign. The German offensive could have fared much worse in the beginning stages but they were lucky enough that Allied airpower was inhibited by the cover of bad weather. On December 25th, 1945 the tide turned when the weather lifted and Allied air support wreaked havoc on German armor. Had the bad weather held up, the German armor might have been able to inflict more damage. Magenheimer also stated that the Ardennes offensive made a fatal flaw in weakening the defensive strength in the Eastern front and because of this weakening trend, the Soviets were able to break through later and pour into Germany to sack Berlin. This point however doesn’t hold for the Eastern front was a losing operation and the area was so vast the amount of troops was not effective. The Anglo-American forces at that point were posing a greater threat to Germany and needed to be addressed.

According to McMillan, the Germans actually accomplished three things in the ill fated operation. They forced the Allies into action before they were ready, inflicted great damage to Allied troops with heavy Allied casualties and loss of machines, and the caused the Allies to suffer these losses at a crucial moment. The Allies had heavy losses due to the battle. The western offensive capabilities of the Allies were reduced by ten percent.17 Two whole Allied infantry divisions were almost completely destroyed and nine out of fourteen were badly disrupted. “All eight of the American armored divisions which took part lost heavily and five of them were eliminated.”18And lastly, the Allied command structure was weakened due to problems internally within the Allied command. Their confusion and internal quarrels had negative effects on the unified and decisive command structure.19 It also inflicted a great amount of damage to the Allied Command structure at the highest levels. “Relations had already been strained between Eisenhower and Montgomery, Bradley and Montgomery, Eisenhower Patton and between Third Army’s staff and SHAEF. During the Ardennes fighting certain events occurred which upset these relationships even more.”20These German accomplishments usually get forgotten underneath the overall picture of a German failure however, they still are significant and hampered and delayed the Allied efforts in winning the war. The successes were just not enough.

The consequences of the ill-fated offensive spurred from a pattern of Germany’s inability to retreat. This was due to embedded ideologies of ruthlessness spun deeply into the Nazi ideals. Hitler’s policy of not allowing defeat at any cost, even if a small defeat provided a promising tactical outcome for the next move, meant that the offensive would have no choice but to keep attacking no matter the outcome. According to the perspective of Charles Sydnor, the last gamble was a slippery slope for Germany and the Third Reich was doomed by the fact that Hitler would ignore his advisor’s intelligent suggestions in order to evade any suggestion of a defeat no mater how chaotic the loss of men and resources21, Hitler would choose to lose everything rather than retreat no matter how hopeless. Sydnor points out that the attitude that was embedded in the German ethos to do nothing but conquer and succeed had no room for pulling back and defending because that would portray the country as cowardly or weak, something Hitler would never allow. Due to Hitler’s state of opinion the only option was for Germany to show a strong offensive in order to keep consistent with the aggressive ideology of the crumbling Nazi regime.

The Germans were successful taking down St. Vith, but they failed to hold Bastogne. The Germans were low on fuel supplies, however it was in the plan that the Germans would attack and seized Allied fuel supply dumps and use the precious fuel for their Panzers. This addition to their plan is yet another reason why the offensive was a more plausible option then opposing historians might think. It was a very real possibility for Germans to hijack fuel supplies from Allied supply dumps. Instances like this occurred during the Battle of the Bulge. Peter Elstob gave an account where a Panzer Division overran a supply depot and forced the surrendered Allied troops to refuel their tanks. This travesty for the Allied troops to be forced to supply vital fuel that would allow the Germans to advance was made worse when the Germans massacred them all in cold blood after they finished pumping the last drops into the fuel tanks of the Panzers.22 Better coordination of objectives to take these supply dumps may have increased the Germans chance in making the offensive more effective. If done correctly, by seizing the fuel and supplies that the Panzers required, the end story would have ended much differently. Fully fueled, all the German Panzer divisions attacking in full force with the capability to plow all the way to their original objectives could have very much changed the situation in overwhelming the Allies, splitting their forces and turning the tide of the battle. Even in this plan, Germany had no hope in winning the war. It was facing the grave fact of attrition and its vast loss in both resources and the increasing pressure of a two front war. Its collapse was inevitable. A successful offensive in the Ardennes, however, would have been a great morale boost for the Third Reich while at the same time putting a wrench into the Allies’ plans perhaps delaying their advance longer but in no way stopping it indefinitely. The United States had too large of an industry and the incredible ability to reinforce massive amounts of equipment something that Germany desperately needed but lacked.

Despite the complete failure of the offensive the Germans had no other viable option if they were to continue with the Nazi philosophy of never retreating and aggression. Giving up already gained territory and pulling back in a recoiled defensive definition was an alien concept to Hitler and he would not stand for it. He wanted to direct a blow at the Allies and a small offensive wouldn’t have been effective enough. With as much failure witnessed on the Eastern front, turning towards the closing threat in the West was a much more viable option. The large offensive did hold some success. It did achieve the desired surprise. Peter Elstob was correct in the fact that even though it was doomed to fail, the large offensive was the most appealing and best shot for Germany to both inflict damage on the Allies and to also keep its dignity. The Allies did not see it coming and were caught both off guard and by surprise. The Germans also had some success in the beginning of the offensive, such as capturing St Vith, and inflicting heavy Allied casualties. Also the fact that the Allies suffered these losses at a crucial moment was a strain on the Allied plans of advancing. It was also devastating for the high Allied command structure to be ruptured as bad as it did due to the Battle of the Bulge. Unified Allied command was important and under great strain. The Allies managed to find a way to work together. The Allies morale was at first reduced to dismal conditions for they realized that they were wrong to think that they could win the war before Christmas. The attack did three things to boost the Allies’ confidence and future effectiveness according to John Eisenhower. He stated that it proved the abilities and bravery of the American soldier to the German. It also proved the effectiveness of the decision making of American generals and that they could make both smart tactical moves as well as imaginative ones. Patton proved this point by pulling his troops out of combat turning the Third Army around and moving up to the area of Bastogne for a counter-attack. This proved an ingenious move showed the amazing state of discipline of his men. Lastly, it proved that no amount of strain could breakdown the Anglo-American alliance which held strong and the two nations worked in conjuncture with each other to attack Germany.23 The Allies’ success in the Ardennes really enhanced these traits and strengthened their confidence which played an important part in the remainder of the war. The fleeting success of the Germans, however, did not much matte for it was doomed to fail as the Allies managed to hold crucial points such as Bastogne and inflicted heavy losses to the Germans. The limited fuel supply cut a wound that would not heal causing the German armored divisions to never reach the city of Antwerp. The devastating loss to German men and material hampered the months to come with an added dismal state of German morale as it tasted the strong bitter taste of defeat and inevitable impending doom, yet the offensive still remained the best option that proved the Germans were bold enough not to give up.

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1 Keegan John Collins Atlas of World War II. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006.32-33.

2 Murray Williamson and Allan R Millet. A War to Be Won Fighting the Second World War. Cambridge: Belknap Press. 2000

58-81

3 Keegan John Collins Atlas of World War II. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006. 144-145.

4 Dupuy, Trevor N David Bongard and Richard Anderson . Hitler’s Last Gamble: the Battle of the Bulge, December 1944-January 1945. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994. 9-10.

5 Merriam, Robert E. Dark December: The Full Account of the Battle of the Bulge. Chicago: Ziff Davis Publishing Company, 1947. 3-4

6 Merriam, Robert E. Dark December: 4-5

7 Elstob, Peter. Hitler’s Last Offensive: The Full Story of the Battle of the Ardennes. New York: The MacMillian Company, 1971. 366-368

8 Elstob, Peter. Hitler’s Last Offensive:367

9 Elstob, Peter. Hitler’s Last Offensive:367

10 Elstob, Peter. Hitler’s Last Offensive: The Full Story of the Battle of the Ardennes. New York: The MacMillian Company, 1971. 390

11 Dupuy, Trevor N David Bongard and Richard Anderson . Hitler’s Last Gamble: the Battle of the Bulge, December 1944-January 1945. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994. 20.

12Eisenhower, John D. The Bitter Woods. New York: GP Putnams Sons, 1969.432

13 Dupuy, 360.

14 Murray Williamson and Allan R Millet. A War to Be Won Fighting the Second World War. Cambridge: Belknap Press. 2000 464.

15 Merriam, Robert E. Dark December: The Full Account of the Battle of the Bulge. Chicago: Ziff Davis Publishing Company, 1947. 259.

16 Magenheimer, 261.

17 Elstob 369

18 Elstob, Peter. Hitler’s Last Offensive: The Full Story of the Battle of the Ardennes. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1971. 369

19 Macmillan. p368.

20 Elstob, Peter. Hitler’s Last Offensive: The Full Story of the Battle of the Ardennes. New York: The MacMillian Company, 1971. 371

21 Sydonr Charles J Soldiers of Destruction The SS Death Head Division 1933-144 New Jersey, Princton University Press 1977

22 Elstob, Peter. Hitler’s Last Offensive: The Full Story of the Battle of the Ardennes. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1971. 153-162

23 Eisenhower, John D. The Bitter Woods. New York: GP Putnams Sons, 1969. 469-470